International Finance

Financial Inclusion in Kenya

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This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on September 17, 2017

In August, the Brookings Institution released its Financial and Digital Inclusion Project report which evaluates access to and usage of affordable financial services by underserved people across 26 countries. The 2017 report assessed financial inclusion ecosystems in terms of country commitment, mobile capacity, regulatory environment, and adoption of selected traditional and digital financial service. Kenya was ranked number one for the third consecutive year.  Kenya’s top rank was driven by its robust commitment to advancing financial inclusion, widespread adoption of mobile money services among traditionally underserved groups, an increasingly broad range of mobile money services (including insurance and loan products), and an enabling regulatory environment for digital financial services.

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(source: bfsi.eletsonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Financial-Inclusion-2.jpg)

The UN defines financial inclusion universal access, at a reasonable cost, to a wide range of financial services, provided by a variety of sound and sustainable institutions. A key is to ensure that all households and businesses, regardless of income level, have access to, and can effectively use, the appropriate financial services they need to improve their lives. According to the Brookings report, 75 percent of adult Kenyans have a financial account, and 71 percent of women own financial accounts.

This is welcome news for Kenya because, as a study by the University of Nairobi argues, without inclusive financial systems, the poor must rely on their own limited savings and earnings to pursue growth opportunities which can contribute to persistent income inequality and slower economic growth.

However, there are gaps in the report that understate factors that hamper actual and lived financial inclusion in Kenya. While the report acknowledges that Kenya can make further improvements in consumer protection, better regulation of FinTech, improving cybersecurity, enhancing digital infrastructure and promoting financial education among underserved populations (particularly women), other factors were not addressed.

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(source: africamedicare.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Kenyan-government-to-offer-free-maternity-insurance-cover-for-poor-women.jpg)

Firstly, as a UN report points out, innovative and inclusive finance, is not a ‘silver bullet’ to get people out of poverty. If efforts are not made to improve income levels of the economically marginalised, then access to financial services is of limited use. Financial inclusion is not useful in and of itself as it can only be leveraged when income levels allow robust use of systems established.

Secondly, is the issue of risk profiling in existing financial systems that may lock out the poor from actual access to financial services. The availability of numerous financial products is useless to those who are denied access to products due to their risk profile. Now that the network of inclusion exists, affordable financial products ought to be created for the financially marginalised so that digital platforms become a more effective means of expanding economic empowerment.

Finally is the interest rate cap and how it has affected lived financial inclusion in Kenya. The cap has been associated with a notable decline in credit growth particularly in ‘high risk’ segments such as SMEs, the self-employed and informal businesses. What is the use of having a financial account if in reality, one cannot qualify for the financing that makes having the financial account useful in the first place? While there are welcome signs that the cap may be reversed in the near future, the report ought to better incorporate the interrogation of domestic factors that regress progress made in terms of actual, lived financial inclusion.

Kenya ought to be proud of achievements garnered in terms of financial inclusion yet remain aware of further improvements that ought to be made to better link financial inclusion with economic empowerment and development.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetsew@gmail.com

 

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China taking over manufacturing in Africa?

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This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on September 10, 2017

Earlier this year, McKinsey and Company, released a report on Sino-African relations that assessed the activities of Chinese businesses in Africa as well as Sino-African economic partnerships. There are about 10,000 Chinese-owned firms operating in Africa today and about 90 percent of these are privately owned debunking the myth that Chinese business activity in Africa is dominated by State Owned Enterprises and overly influenced by state craft. Of particular interest is understanding how the Chinese presence is informing industrial development, a chronically underdeveloped sector on the continent.

31 percent of Chinese firms in Africa are in manufacturing and they already handle about 12 percent of industrial production in Africa with annual revenues of about USD 60 billion; revenues in manufacturing outstrip that of any other sector listed. Chinese factories are focused on Africa’s domestic markets, 93 percent of revenues come from local or regional sales in Africa.

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(source: https://cdn.static-economist.com/sites/default/files/images/print-edition/20140208_MAP001_0.jpg)

One third of Chinese firms report profit margins of over 20 percent in 2015. In manufacturing this is attributed to ample pricing headroom in Africa; prevailing market prices for manufactured products are so high that Chinese firm earn comfortable profits and their profit levels are higher than those of African firms. Interestingly although manufacturing is capital investment and commitment heavy, 31 percent of firms made investment decisions within a week. 67 percent of firms investments are self-financed and Chinese companies are optimistic about the future of the African market with most firms indicating plans for expansion.

Chinese firms are also generating local employment as 89 percent of employees are African; this figure is 95 percent in the manufacturing sector. 61 percent of firms upskill African employees through professional training and/or apprenticeships, an indication that Africa is poor at educating Africans with skills relevant for employment. In terms of management, 44 percent of managers are African, this figure is 54 percent in the manufacturing sector. Chinese firms contribute to African markets mainly by introducing new products, services, technologies and methods.

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(source: kessbenfm.com/kfm-data/china-in-africa.jpg)

The report is clearly optimistic of Chinese firm activity in Africa, for example more content is focused on detailing the benefits than to delineating the costs; one wonders why. And the costs are significant, there are concerns of Chinese firms engaging in dumping where they sell products in export markets at prices below those in domestic markets. This may be leading to ‘unfair’ capture of export markets from African firms. Breaches of labour regulations are more common among Chinese firms than in other foreign-owned firms. These include inhumane working conditions, work without contracts, exceeding legal limits on work hours and threatening to fire workers who refuse to work in unsafe conditions.

Clearly Chinese firms will continue to make inroads into Africa and the continent will accrue many benefits from this but will also have to vigilantly manage the costs. With regards to industrialisation, it will be interesting to see how African industrial policy will be structured to encourage a stronger indigenous presence in the sector given the ability, innovation, efficiency and commitment of Chinese manufacturing firms, firms which also benefit from African trade deals as they are domicile here. Chinese firms make it clear that there is a lucrative domestic market that indigenous firms have failed to fully tap and thus African firms have a lot to learn from Chinese firms. If trends continue, a situation may emerge where African industrialisation is owned and dominated by Chinese firms. While this is welcome in terms of contributions to Africa’s development, can it then be termed ‘African’ industrialisation?

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzestew@gmail.com

TV Interview: The effect of the elections on the economy

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On September 7 2017, I was on a panel on Citizen TV discussing the effect of the elections on the Kenyan economy.

Industrialisation in Kenya: What do political party manifestos say?

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This article first appeared in The East African on July 24, 2017

 

Further development of manufacturing can play a central role in driving economic transformation and job creation in Kenya. There is now a window of opportunity for Kenya (and other East African countries) to capitalise on positive underlying factors in the global economy – including rising wages in Asia, the rebalancing underway in China, and strong regional growth in Africa – and significantly expand its capabilities and global presence in export-oriented, labour-intensive manufacturing within the next 20 to 30 years.

But the recent performance of the Kenyan manufacturing sector has been weak. The share of manufacturing in Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP) was only 9.2 percent in 2016 (well below average for a country with Kenya’s level of income) and this share has been declining in recent years. Several decades ago, Kenya had a relatively complex and substantial industrial sector by regional standards, but its East African neighbours have been catching up in recent years.

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(source: http://www.industrialization.go.ke/images/kenya_manufacturing.jpg)

Decisive and comprehensive action is required in order to reverse the decline, double manufacturing production and employment, and increase the share of manufacturing to 15 percent of GDP within the next five years. With this in mind, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) developed a 10-point policy plan to transform Kenyan manufacturing and create jobs. These 10 points, based on close co-operation amongst a range of stakeholders, aim to inform pre-election debates and can also be used by the new government to implement a more focused and effective industrialisation strategy.

There has been an analysis of the manifestos of the three main political parties to determine the extent to which they support manufacturing in Kenya and the region. The manifestos of Jubilee, the National Super Alliance (NASA) and the Third Way Alliance were launched at the end of June 2017. All three parties emphasise the industrial agenda as central to Kenya’s economic transformation in general terms, which is encouraging, with NASA emphasising innovative initiatives and especially the small and medium enterprise (SME) and informal sector, and Jubilee and the Third Way Alliance being more specific in their recommendations.

There are a range of notable similarities with the 10 policy priorities in the KAM-ODI booklet. Firstly, all three parties prioritise addressing either general or specific aspects of the enabling environment. The Third Way Alliance commits to addressing counterfeit goods, one of the KAM-ODI action points. Secondly, all three parties want to enforce a fiscal regime that is predictable and fair, a key action point among the ten policy priorities, and emphasise fair taxation in particular. Jubilee further discusses the action point on devolution. The Jubilee manifesto discusses the KAM-ODI action point on land banks and NASA and the Third Way Alliance discuss industrial parks, which need land. The Third Way Alliance pledges to work with county governments to set aside land for industrial parks, offering a practical way to implement the KAM-ODI action point on securing land for SEZs and industrial parks.

The feasibility of the creation land banks and setting aside land for industry will be linked to issues of acrimony over land title and cost of relocating populations on said pieces of land. For example, an SEZ was due to be set up in the Western part of the country but had to be scrapped as an agreement could not be reached on what land could be used due to claims of title on the piece of land. Thus all parties will have to undergo a thorough land audit in the areas the government intends to develop industrial parks and SEZs and begin with areas where there is clear land title that is not contested.

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(source: https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/kenya1.jpg)

In terms of energy, NASA discusses the need for an energy policy. Jubilee highlights the need for lower electricity tariffs for industrial usage and the Third Way Alliance calls for liberalisation of the energy sector and revisions to electricity billing and pricing to reduce the cost of electricity for key manufacturing sectors. Both NASA and Jubilee highlight the need for investment in electricity infrastructure. Jubilee also emphasises green energy and, in a similar vein, NASA and the Third Way Alliance focus on ramping up clean and renewable power generation.

What most of the manifestos are not clear on is how they will reduce the cost of energy in the country. For example, Kenya needs a reduction of five cents per kilowatt hour would bring the cost down to that in Tanzania. It is only the Third Way Alliance manifesto that states they will tackle the cost of energy issues by liberalising the energy sector and revising electricity billing and pricing. However, an additional problem with energy in Kenya is power outages; Kenya has more power outages than Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia. None of the manifestos are not clear on how this will be addressed. All three manifestos are vague on the type of reforms and investments needed to address inefficiencies and incentivise investment in power transmission and distribution.

All three parties suggest the establishment of industrial funds or development banks specific for industrialisation, such as an export-import bank (Jubilee and the Third Way Alliance) or a co-operative fund for agro-processing (NASA). But none of the parties place strong emphasis on suggestions for financial sector development. Similarly, the three parties’ manifestos do not give attention to foreign direct investment (FDI) to promote industrialisation. While these plans sound feasible, the implementation of these financing schemes will determine uptake by private sector. Ideally, the funds should offer financing perhaps at concessionary rates. The most important factor however is that the funds need to be patient such that private sector has time to use the capital effectively and generate returns over a realistic period of time. Yet the manifestos are not very clear on how financing to the sector will be structured. The Jubilee manifesto comes closest to specifics, stating that they seek to provide long-term credit funded by long-term bonds; one wonders why this strategy has not already been deployed. Further, none of the parties place strong emphasis on suggestions for financial sector development or how to promote FDI to support industrialisation.

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In terms of skills, NASA and the Third Way Alliance highlight the importance of general education, whilst Jubilee prioritises the need to nurture a globally competitive work force to power industrialisation. NASA and Jubilee stress the importance of linkages between universities and the rest of society, although Jubilee seems clearest on this and explicitly mentions the need to develop formal linkages between the private sector, academia and government. At the moment, there is a sizeable gap between what is taught to students and what the job market requires. Therefore, if curricula are not significantly revised and linked to a push to encourage students to take up of science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM) subjects, any partnerships with academia may not be fruitful in terms of creating a labour force with skills required for industrialisation. Jubilee manifesto’s pledge to promote the study of science, technology, engineering and maths but again, one wonders this has not already been done. Both the NASA and Third Way Alliance manifestos do not contain specific details on which subject areas to target for educational improvements.

NASA and Jubilee highlight the role of a fit for purpose civil service to support industrialisation. NASA stresses the need to reduce contractors’ cost of doing business with government, streamline procurement, process payments promptly and inculcate a zero tolerance approach to corruption. Jubilee wants a truly fit for purpose public service, and mentions the importance of reducing waste, dealing with procurement and rationalising the public sector wage bill. The Third Way Alliance has a narrower focus on measures to combat corruption. This element will likely prove to be the most difficult to implement as Kenya has notoriously been unable to hold those implicated in corruption scandals to account. Thus, it is dubious as to whether any of the parties have the political will required to implement this element of the manifestos.

The Third Way Alliance manifesto places strong emphasis on developing value chains in priority manufacturing sectors, including agro-processing, textiles and leather; but some of the Alliance’s proposals to support value chain development are quite protectionist in nature. The NASA and Jubilee manifestos also mention value chains, with the NASA manifesto emphasising synergies and linkages amongst enterprises. The issue of value chains is closely linked to agriculture and what has become clear over the first iteration of devolution is that agriculture seems to be neglected by both county and national governments in terms of budget allocations. According to the International Budget Partnership (IBP), national government allocated the sector as follows: 2 percent in 2015/16, 1.3 percent in 2016/2017 and 1.8 percent in 2017/18. As IBP points out, the Maputo Declaration 2003 calls for allocation of at least 10 percent of total national budget towards agriculture. The average expenditure on agriculture in Africa is 4.5 percent; Kenya’s national allocations are clearly sub-par. Thus for the value chain manifesto declarations to work, there is need to more robust allocations to agriculture at national and county level and better coordination between the two levels of government; none of the manifestos articulate how they would make this happen.

In the context of the EAC, the push for exports in the KAM-ODI booklet is important. Both NASA and Jubilee press for better market access, NASA for SMEs in particular. Improving and/or maintaining market access in the EAC is an important element of the NASA and Jubilee manifestos, aligning well with the KAM-SET call for an export push. The Jubilee manifesto focuses on expanding Kenya’s access to the US in textiles, whereas NASA emphasises market access for MSEs. In contrast, improving access to markets for Kenyan exports is not prioritised in the Third Way Alliance manifesto.

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To be clear, access to EAC for manufactured goods is riddled with problems. Total exports from Kenya the EAC registered a 4 percent decline in 2016 to KES 121.7 billion, with exports to Uganda and Rwanda falling by 9.3 percent and 2.5 percent respectively. Further, opportunities offered by the EAC’s integrated market has institutional and regulatory barriers to trade such as such as customs clearance, standards and certification, rules of origin, licences and permits, truck inspections and language barriers.  None of the manifestos address these issues. Further, the entry of China and India into the regional market has eroded Kenya’s EAC market share from 9 percent in 2009 to just 7 percent by 2013.  The World Bank claims that Kenya’s trade performance is declining quickly due to an influx of goods from China into Uganda and Tanzania, which are major export destinations for Kenya.  In the manifestos it is not clear how EAC market access issues will be addressed. The Jubilee and NASA manifestos make general statements about Kenya’s role within the EAC, but there is little detail in either manifesto in terms of specific measures or priorities to support access for Kenyan goods in the EAC market. The Third Way Alliance’s manifesto does not make any reference to Kenya’s role in a regional context.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetse@gmail.com

How Kenya can industrialise in 5 years

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This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on June 18, 2017

Manufacturing can play a crucial role in Kenya’s inclusive growth by absorbing large numbers of workers, creating jobs indirectly through forward and backward linkages to agriculture, raising exports and transforming the economy through technological innovation.

It is with this in mind that the Overseas Development Institute and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers coordinated a multi-stakeholder process to determine how the manufacturing sector can create 300,000 jobs and increase the share of manufacturing in GDP to 15 percent in 5 years.

A plan titled ‘10 policy priorities for transforming manufacturing and creating jobs’, has been developed focused on key actions that can be taken to build the manufacturing sector and achieve the aforementioned goals. The plan is rooted in the Kenya Industrial Transformation Programme and the Vision 2030 Manufacturing Agenda targeted at priority sectors of both formal and informal manufacturers (jua kali) as both sectors need support if Kenya is to industrialise equitably.

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(source: http://www.industrialization.go.ke/images/kenya_manufacturing.jpg)

The first issue to address is the business environment in Kenya. While Kenya has moved up 21 places, in its position World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Rank, considerable constraints exist particularly in dealing with construction permits, paying taxes and registering property. Thus further action is needed to improve the business environment. Additionally, for manufacturing to flourish the country needs a fiscal regime that is more articulated to support the sector. Fiscal policy at both national and county level needs to be more deliberately leveraged to support industrialisation through, for example, developing fiscal incentives that drive investment into manufacturing.

The third action point concerns making land more accessible and affordable. Research by Hass Consult reveals that the price of land in and around Nairobi has increased by a factor of 6.11 to 8.05 since 2007. Aggressive increases in land price dampen investor appetite for investment in manufacturing which tends to be land intense. Thus there is a need to prevent inflationary speculation on land prices, and develop government land banks earmarked for industry.

Energy costs continue to be punitive in the country and make Kenya’s manufacturing sector less competitive than even its East African neighbours. Government efforts need to not only target increasing energy generation but also lower energy prices and increase the quality and consistency of energy to the industrial sector. This should be coupled with a key gap constraining the sector- access to finance. Manufacturing companies, particularly SMEs and informal industry, are undercapitalised and face multiple obstacles to obtaining access to finance. Bespoke financing mechanisms aimed at the sector, such as through an Industrial Development Fund, need to be fast-tracked.

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(source: https://newsghana.com.gh/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/wpid-manufacturing150115.jpg)

Kenya cannot leverage manufacturing for economic development without creating a more aggressive export push into regional and international markets. Kenya’s exports to the EAC are declining and opportunities such as AGOA can be tapped into more effectively. Additionally, Kenya needs to reorient education policy and skills development towards STEM subjects so that the skills in the labour pool drive the growth of manufacturing.

Finally, overall coordination in the sector is crucial. An agency in government should be created that coordinates all government entities relevant to industrialisation such as agriculture, education and the National Treasury. The private sector also needs to better coordinate particularly along value chains to drive sub-sector growth in a more robust and targeted manner. Finally, there is a need for better coordination between public and private sector through fostering trust and reciprocity to drive industrialisation forward.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetsew@gmail.com

Podcast: Chinese debt in Africa

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I talked with Eric Olander of The China Africa Project on growing Chinese debt in Africa.

 

What China’s One Belt, One Road initiative means for Africa

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This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on May 21, 2017

Last week China announced a plan to build a vast global infrastructure network linking Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East into ‘One Belt, One Road’. China plans to spend up to USD 3 trillion on infrastructure in an effort that seems to be centred more on linking 60 countries in the world with China, not necessarily each other. This One Belt initiative is perhaps part of China’s determination to position itself as the world’s leader in the context of Trump’s insular USA. This initiative has two-fold implications for Africa: the opportunities and potential problems that it creates.

One belt, one road

(source: https://qz.com/983581/chinas-new-silk-road-one-belt-one-road-project-has-one-major-pitfall-for-african-countries/)

In terms of opportunity, obviously African needs continued financial support in infrastructure development. The Africa Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that Africa’s infrastructure deficit amounts to USD 93 billion annually until 2021. In this sense any effort to support the development of Africa’s infrastructure is welcome.

Secondly, this is an opportunity for Africa to negotiate the specifics of the type of infrastructure the continent requires and create a win-win situation where Africa leverages Chinese financing to not only address priority infrastructure gaps, but also better interlink the continent.

However there are multiple challenges the first of which is that Europe, India and Japan seem edgy about this initiative and have distanced themselves from it. According to India’s Economic Times, India and Japan are together embarking upon multiple infrastructure projects across Africa and Asia in what could be viewed as pushback against China’s One Belt initiative. The countries have launched their own infrastructure development projects linking Asia-Pacific to Africa to balance China’s influence in the region.

Europe is also edgy because the initiative has not been collaborative and comes across as an edict from China; countries in the initiative were not consulted. Europe is also uneasy with the lack of details and transparency of the initiative seeing it as a new strategy to further enable China to sell Chinese products to the world.

Secondly, analysts have pointed out that from an Africa perspective, the One Belt seems to continue the colonial legacy of building infrastructure to get resources out of the continent, not interlink the continent. Will the initiative entrench Africa’s position as a mere raw material supplier to China and facilitate the natural resource exploitation of the continent?

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(source: africanbusinessmagazine.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Africa-infrastructure-1k.jpg)

Additionally, there are concerns with how the financing will be structured and deployed. Will financing be debt or grants? It can be argued that China needs to increase its free aid toward Africa in order to build its image as a global leader. Further, who will build the infrastructure? Africa has grown weary of China linking its financing to the contracting of Chinese companies. Will this infrastructure drive employ Africans and use African companies? If not, then it can argued that Africa will merely be borrowing money from China to pay itself back.

Linked to the point above, is the fact that Africa is already deeply indebted to China. In Kenya, China owns half of the country’s external debt. Kenya will pay about KES 60 billion to the China Ex-Im Bank alone over the next three years.  Kenya and Africa do not need more debt from China, and if this initiative is primarily debt-financed (in a non-concessionary manner), it will cause considerable concern in African capitals.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetsew@gmail.com