This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on May 19, 2019
There are several factors that inform the extent to which a government is able to develop a vision for the country’s development, and actually implement it consistently over time. One key factor is the seriousness with which qualified and experienced technocrats are taken. The emphasis is on qualified technocrats, not unqualified individuals who have been given technocratic positions.
Qualified, experienced and creative technocrats, when operating in an environment underpinned by transparency and accountability can play a crucial role in steering a country’s development towards more prosperity and equity. Sadly, many African countries have challenges with taking qualified technocrats seriously. There are several factors that inform why most African governments often underplay the extent to which technocrats can inform long-term, sustainable development.
The first is the simply how young African government institutions are. Most independent African governments are about fifty years old, and in reality they are much younger if you take out years of civil war, dictatorship and aggressive interference from foreign governments. The fact that government institutions are so young, often means that the institutional structures that would allow technocracy to flourish often do not exist. Institutional structures such as robust financing practices, performance based contracting, project management systems and result delivery structures are weak. As a result, in many government bodies, one will find that the institution is only as good as its leader. If a given government body has a motivated, accountable and effective leader, a great deal can be accomplished.
This is being seen in Kenya under devolution and the rise of county governments. It is often be easier to make development progress with governor who appoints qualified technocrats, and demands accountability and performance than with a governor who fills the cabinet with friends and relatives who have no technocratic capacity and facilitates a lack of accountability. The same can be said of National Government bodies. Thus, political processes aside, the fact that government bodies are so young, means that the leadership will often define the extent to which qualified technocrats will be able to steer the development of that government entity.
The second factor, is five year election cycles. When juxtaposed with young and often weak government institutions, what often happens is that the country’s development is politically driven, speaking to what is politically expedient during the election year. Yet politicians make election promises that require serious technocratic competence to achieve. But once a government is elected, what sometimes happens is that some technocratic appointments are made with political expediency in mind, not competence or implementation capacity. Further, five year election cycles often mean that top technocrats are replaced depending on which government is elected. As a result, there is often no consistency at the technocratic level, that allows a development plan and vision to be implemented through five year election cycles.
It is important that Africa begins to grapple with these serious issues. For as long as governments fail to deliberately build robust institutions, and continue to view technocratic positions through the lens of political expediency, it will be very difficult to tap into the considerable experience of African professionals, and develop the ability to not only create a credible vision for the continent, but implement it consistently over time.
Anzetse Were is a development economist
This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on May 12, 2019
A few weeks ago, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) released their annual Economic Survey which indicated fewer jobs were created in 2018, than in 2017. In 2018, a total of 840,600 new jobs were created; this figure was 897,000 in 2017. As usual, the informal sector dominated in job creation, creating 83.6 percent of all jobs. The Economic Survey also revealed that the total number of self-employed and unpaid family workers rose from 139,400 in 2017 to 152,200 people in 2018.
These statistics point to three job related challenges in Kenya. The first is that last year fewer jobs were created, despite the fact that each year about 500,000 new entrants enter the job market, let alone those already in the job market but unemployed and job-seeking. In a year where GDP growth was stronger than the previous year, why was job creation so low, particularly formal job creation?
Secondly, the survey pointed to the continued trend in the informal sector dominating job creation. But due to the lack of investment in informal businesses in terms of physical premises, access to finance, access to relevant technology, increased market access and skill updating, the quality of jobs created is low. Jobs in the informal sector are often seasonal, and do not come with the secure wages, job security, health and safety standards and benefits of formal jobs. As a result, the lived job experience of most Kenyans, is low quality. For example, informal sector manufacturing sites and markets often lack basics such as reasonable sanitation facilities, access to electricity and adequate/safe physical structures, let alone access to the specialised facilities required for their specific sectors.
Finally is the issue of involuntary self-employment and unpaid work. The story is often told of the young university student whom, after graduating, spends a few years looking for a job and seeing none in sight, decides to start a business activity in order to make an income. In a country where there is no government social security net for the unemployed, most Kenyans end up starting some type of entrepreneurial activity in order to survive. But if you were to ask many, they are involuntarily self-employed. Many want a job, but the limited availability of jobs forces most in self-employment, or even worse, unpaid work.
There is a trend in Kenya and much of Africa, of formal companies, with reasonable budgets, offering to pay people, especially the youth, in what they call ‘exposure’. The company argues that the exposure that Kenyan will get in presenting their skills at their event, is sufficient payment. And because many are desperate, and looking for a break into a stable job, especially in the formal sector, they accept ‘payment in exposure’ even for years. This is blatant exploitation. If a company uses the talents and skills of Kenyans, especially young Kenyans, as part of their company activity, they should pay for it and stop paying people via ‘exposure’. You can’t eat or pay your bills with exposure.
An environment where the demand for jobs, especially formal jobs, outstrips supply, creates conditions where exploitation runs rife. It is important that the challenges related to job creation and quality elucidated above, are not exploited but rather provide impetus for responsible and just behavior.
Anzetse Were is a development economist
This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on May 5, 2019
Last week, the Chinese government hosted the second Belt and Road Forum, inviting countries around the world to engage in the conversation on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Of course, African countries are key players in the BRI not only because it serves interests from the Chinese government and private sector, but also because the BRI provides what African governments view as an opportunity to meet the continent’s infrastructure deficit. During the Forum, key developments occurred that affect African governments, one of which concerned Kenya.
It was revealed that the Kenyan government failed to secure USD 3.68 billion from China (in loans and grants) to take the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) from Naivasha to Kisumu, and on to the Malaba border with Uganda. The Kenya government has consistently sold the SGR as a key infrastructure development and investment it has made on behalf of the Kenyan people. And yet, during a conference focused on infrastructure financing from China, their core infrastructure financing objective from China was not met. The question is, why? And what does this mean for Kenya? In my view this is good news and demonstrates a seriousness from the Chinese government that perhaps the Kenyan government didn’t anticipate.
Firstly, Kenyans seem relieved by this development. Kenyans have grown weary of what they view as a government with fundamental problems with corruption and fiscal accountability, continuing to secure massive amounts of debt. In declining to finance the final stages of the SGR, this seems to signal the Chinese government is coginsant of these concerns. Financial feasibility is a core concern, and given the serious problems with corruption linked to the previous phases of SGR that the Kenyan government has clearly seemed unable to resolve, why should they get more money? So diplomacy issues aside, money is money and it has to be feasibly and prudently used. China has signaled that there are pending issues to be addressed and they have a keen interest on how their money is used.
Secondly, it has given the Kenyan government pause for thought. When what has been profiled as an important diplomatic and developmental project fails to secure financing from the Chinese government, the Kenya government is being asked what went wrong? As a Kenyan economist, this signals that as far as China is concerned, it’s not business as usual. The SGR is an anchor BRI project, and yet it has been put on hold. The Kenyan government needs to use this as yet another signal, that there are fundamental problems with its financial accountability structures. There are no shortcuts on this issue.
Finally, it signals a shift in China’s approach to lending and debt to African governments. While Ethiopia got debt relief, Kenya was unable to secure new debt. So a willingness of China to lend or forgive debt is not the issue. Context is important. In some cases, China has communicated a willingness to forgive debt, in other cases, such as Kenya, China has made it clear that core concerns have to addressed before substantial debt is conferred.
In short, the Belt and Road Forum is a key turning point in how China lends to Africa. It is up to each African government to demonstrate that it is a responsible custodian of public finances. Not because of China or any other external party, but because their countries will never develop as long as African governments continue to misappropriate public funds. Let African governments play this as they will, African publics are watching.
Anzetse Were is a development economist
On April 4, I was a guest on CGTN’s Global Business with Ramah Nyang. With 22 countries having ratified the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Treaty, it’s set to take effect from May 30 2019. But will the
#AfCFTA be just another colossal AU dud? As I suggest, “we’ve got to get rid of the paranoia.”
This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on April 28, 2019
As a development economist, I am often asked why Kenyans and Africans often do not feel the effects of the economic growth of their countries. Last year Kenya’s economy grew at about 6 percent, East Africa’s at 6.1 percent, and Africa’s at 3.2 percent. Yet, many are of the view that incomes continue to be strained and financial stress more accentuated. So where does all the growth go? There are several factors behind the disconnect between economic growth and feelings of economic welfare in Africa.
The first is that, in some countries, while the economy is growing, GDP per capita growth is in negative figures. GDP per capita basically divides the country’s GDP by its total population. Some argue that it’s a useful gauge to determine how prosperous a country feels to each of its citizens. To be clear there are problems with using GDP per capita alone to determine economic well being as it does not account for purchasing power parity or inequality, but it does give a general sense of whether the economy is growing such that each citizen has more when the total GDP is divided evenly. And here Africa has a mixed picture; while most countries are registering increases in GDP per capita, some are not. Some Africa countries have negative GDP per capita growth which means GDP growth is not keeping pace and in some cases, citizens are economically worse off than the years before.
But this is not the case in most of Africa, and certainly not East Africa. GDP per capita has been growing in most of Africa and East African economies are top performers according to some estimates. Kenya has certainly been registering positive GDP per capita growth. So the question is why, even in cases where the economy is growing well, and GDP per capita is increasing, do most Kenyans and Africans not feel these effects? The simple answer is income inequality but in Africa, it is useful to unpack this through the lens of informality.
In Kenya, 83 percent of employed Kenyans are in the informal sector, which contributes about 35 percent to the country’s GDP (highest estimate I have found). Data problems aside, the bottom line is that when 83 percent of employed labour contributes 35 percent to GDP, it means that 17 percent of employed labour contributes to and enjoys over 65 percent of GDP. Thus, profits, income growth and growth in economic prosperity are skewed towards formal labour. And while there is still significant income inequality in the formal sector, the formal sector is far better at being an anchor of economic welfare than the informal sector in terms of wages paid, wage growth, job security, and job quality.
This imbalance is why many do not feel the effects of economic growth. The returns of the hard work and effort of millions of Kenyans and Africans in the informal sector are paltry and keep most at a subsistence level of living. The irony is that despite being the biggest employer in the economy, African governments continue to neglect this sector. The economic welfare of Kenyans and Africans would improve if the informal sector was provided with the concerted support it requires to become a powerful engine of economic growth everyone can feel.
Anzetse Were is a development economist
A few weeks ago I sat with Aly-Khan Satchu on Metropol TV (Kenya) to discuss the domestic and regional economy. We discussed the Big Four Agenda, factors that prevent EAC economic cooperation, the shifts and emerging economic challenges in Ethiopia, and Ghana.
This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on April 14, 2019
Last week I attended the East Africa Property Investment Summit and participated in the affordable housing panel. The summit, and discussions I have been engaging in on the affordable housing pillar of the Big Four Agenda, highlighted several opportunities that can be leveraged to drive the long-term supply of affordable housing in the Kenyan market. According to estimates, the affordable homes under the Big Four will cost between KES 600,000 and 3 million with the Kenya Mortgage Refinance Company (KMRC) established to facilitate the provision of affordable mortgages. However, the reality is that serious constraints impede the supply of affordable homes in the Kenyan market, key of which have been the cost of construction materials, construction-related fees and a myriad of fiscal and non-fiscal regulatory and legislative obstacles. There are three ways through which the affordable housing pillar can be used to stimulate the long-term supply of affordable housing in Kenya.
The first is to address the exorbitant cost of land in major urban nodes. In this regard, government has indicated a certain level of commitment in the allocation of land for affordable housing developments. However in the long term, urban planning by government has to take a long-term outlook on the development of urban areas and consistently allocate land designated for affordable housing. All rapidly urbanising counties ought to set land aside and then contract private sector to construct the affordable housing units. This will relieve private developers of the cost and hassle of the purchase and transfer of title and thus lower costs in the long-term.
Secondly, there is a need to lower the cost of the manufacture of construction materials. In addition to addressing issues systemic to manufacturing such as lowering the cost of electricity, incentives specific to lowering the cost of locally manufactured construction materials ought to be applied. The Kenya Property Developers Association (KPDA) which represents the residential, commercial and industrial property development sector in Kenya, has an Affordable Housing Taskforce which recommends that government zero rate locally manufactured products used in affordable housing developments.
Thirdly, the domestic private sector ought to be listened to with regards to their ideas on how to stimulate their ability to construct affordable housing on a long term basis. In terms of fiscal incentives, KPDA’s Affordable Housing Taskforce suggests that corporate tax be reduced to 15 percent for approved affordable housing projects and that financing spent on infrastructure linked to affordable housing, be treated as capital expenditure and set off at 100 percent against the tax payable as a capital allowance. With regards to costs linked to regulatory compliance, the suggestion is that government establish a One Stop Shop for all affordable housing approvals and standardise all construction related fees by county governments.
If Kenya is to play the long game in stimulating the consistent supply of affordable homes, government ought to leverage its current focus on the sector and determinedly resolve the factors that prevent private sector from effectively servicing this market segment. In government addressing the structural constraints linked to affordable housing, private sector will be able to more effectively construct homes that Kenyans can afford on an ongoing basis.
Anzetse Were is a development economist