How to develop light manufacturing in Kenya

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This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on June 11, 2017

Last week I attended a meeting organised by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the Africa Centre for Economic Transformation (ACET) and the Government of Ethiopia aimed at analysing and sharing lessons on the development of light manufacturing in Africa.

The development of light manufacturing is an important part of Kenya’s plan for industrialisation as articulated in the Kenya Industrial Transformation Programme (KITP) developed by the Ministry of Industry. The Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Arkebe Oqubay, made some interesting points about key features of light manufacturing of which countries should be cognisant as they implement industrialisation plans.

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(source: http://www.fanabc.com/english/media/k2/items/cache/d9fc17f32b375e9eeed63a6c2d3200a4_XL.jpg?t=1410776827)

The first is no secret; light manufacturing is labour intensive. This feature makes light manufacturing attractive for African countries as an entry point into industrialisation as it has the ability to absorb large pools of labour. While this is attractive, it seems to me that it can create considerable pressure to rapidly skill up a relatively low skilled labour pool. Human and technical resources have to directed to a young and inexperienced labour pool in order to develop a sector with high labour productivity and high profit-making potential. Clearly it can be done, but has to be well thought out with clear links to education policy.

The second point made was that countries cannot implement a light manufacturing strategy without addressing issues in agriculture. Whether it is textiles and apparel, leather and leather products, or food and beverages (F&B) manufacturing, agricultural inputs are crucial. In this sense Kenya faces a conundrum because certain segments of the agricultural sector such as tea, horticulture and floriculture are highly productive, but the rest of the sector wallows in poor productivity and considerable inefficiencies. It is no secret that textile and apparel firms in the EPZs in Kenya import their fabric from abroad, a factor that dampens the ability of this value chain to be an even bigger employer and income earner for Kenyans. The leather value chain in the country is also sub-par and the production capacity for domestic agricultural input into F&B manufacturing is lacklustre. What is clear is that Kenya cannot make serious forays into light manufacturing until the issues in the agricultural sector and value chains are fundamentally addressed.

The final point Oqubay made was that the sector should be export-oriented if scale is to be achieved in a manner that restructures the economy. Insights from ODI on this issue point to the importance of conducive trade rules and trade facilitation measures that lower trade costs both in terms of accessing inputs and export markets. If manufacturers cannot get the inputs they require and reach target export markets, the sector cannot effectively scale.

Other factors important in industrial policy, as pointed out by ODI, is collaboration and coordination between public and private sector in a manner that creates consensus on the strategic direction of the sector and country at large. When coupled with effective investment facilitation, SEZ creation/industry cluster development, and infrastructure development, it creates an environment where light industry can take off.

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(source: https://mpoverello.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/bagamoyosez_zps9cd0561d.png)

Kenya can build on the successes being registered in infrastructure development and expedite the creation of SEZs, learning from countries like Ethiopia. However, the country needs a sharper focus on improving agricultural productivity, a more coherent skills development strategy, vastly improve investment facilitation and more effectively encourage public-private dialogue on the development of light manufacturing in the country.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetsew@gmail.com

 

Podcast: Chinese debt in Africa

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I talked with Eric Olander of The China Africa Project on growing Chinese debt in Africa.

 

The potential of Africa’s blue economy

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This article first appeared in my weekly column of the Business Daily on June 4, 2017

It is estimated that Africa’s coastline hosts a blue economy estimated at USD 1 trillion per year. The UNECA defines the Blue Economy as that which covers both aquatic and marine spaces, including oceans, seas, coasts, lakes, rivers, and underground water encompassing a range of productive sectors, including fisheries, aquaculture, tourism, transport, shipbuilding, energy, bioprospecting, and underwater mining and related activities.

According to Stellenbosch University, Africa’s oceans can and should be an important source of economic activity and growth for the continent, pulling up the standards of living and wealth of Africans. Africa ocean territories are estimated at 13 million km², all of which can drive a blue economy.

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(source: businessfocusantigua.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Blue-Economy-690×457.jpg)

The University of Queensland estimated that the annual economic output of the Western Indian Ocean of which East Africa is a part, is the fourth largest ‘economy’ in the region after South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania. It holds a total asset base of at least USD 333.8 billion and according to UNEP, produces more than USD 25 billion in goods and services every year. The main assets for the region’s blue economy according to the University of Queensland are fisheries, the coastline itself, mangroves, carbon absorption, seagrass beds and corals reefs, carbon sequestration and fisheries. According to UNEP over 60 million people live along the Western Indian coast, many of them deriving their livelihoods from the ocean. In South Africa alone, the blue economy is said to be able to generate 1 million jobs by 2033.

The focus for Kenya’s blue economy according to the Kenya Marine and Fisheries Institute is centred on coastal tourism, offshore oil and gas exploration, deep and short-sea shipping, cruise tourism, fisheries and aquaculture, inland water way transport, offshore wind, blue biotechnology, marine mineral mining, marine aquatic products and ocean renewable energy. However, according to Kenya’s Permanent Secretary for Shipping and Maritime Affairs, Kenya loses KES 90 billion per year in the sector and fails to generate hundreds of thousands of jobs due to a lack of financial support to the sector exacerbated by the under-management and failure to invest in building skilled human capital for and of the sector.

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Sadly, Africa’s ocean areas also tend to be poorly governed with high levels of insecurity that facilitate illegal fishing, sea piracy and armed robbery, drug and human smuggling. According to Greenpeace, Western African economies are estimated to be losing USD 2 billion a year to illegal fishing alone. There is also the problem of chronic mismanagement of blue economy assets. A report led by the World Wildlife Fund found that 35 percent of the fish stocks assessed in the Western Indian Ocean are fully exploited and 28 percent are over-exploited. If the trend continues, Tanzania and Kenya could lose 18 percent of mangrove cover over the next 25 years. Further over 50 percent of the region’s shark species are threatened and 71-100 percent of the region’s coral reefs are at risk.

As Kenya begins to design the priority areas of the Medium Term Plan III under Vision 2030, the blue economy ought to receive special attention. Bear in mind that it will likely be difficult to wrestle the blue economy from the control of illicit players but there is a need to not only do so but also more effectively monetise the sector so that it can become an important generator of economic and social development for the country.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetsew@gmail.com

How to rev up informal industry in Kenya

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This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on May 28, 2017

The creation of high quality employment for Kenyans is a development priority for the country. Unfortunately, an increasing number of Kenyans are finding employment in the informal economy and there is growing informality in job creation. In 2015, 83 percent of employed Kenyans sat in the informal economy, in 2016 that jumped to about 90 percent.

According to the World Bank, labour productivity in Kenya is significantly higher in the formal than in the informal sector. Labour productivity, as measured by sales per worker, is higher in formal firms and thus unsurprisingly, more productive firms pay higher wages. This means the informal sector does not truly generate wealth for the 90 percent of Kenyans employed there. Additionally, in the formal manufacturing sector, job security is relatively high, with more than half of employees holding a permanent job. Contrast this with the informal sector where jobs tend to be seasonal with no benefits, poor working conditions, little social protection and low wages.

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(source: http://www.mediamaxnetwork.co.ke/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Jua-Kali-artisans-at-work.jpg)

However it is important to note that within the informal sector, the manufacturing sector is the most productive. According to the World Bank, informal manufacturers register more sales per worker than both informal agriculture and services; the furniture industry performs particularly well. In terms of firm growth, again, informal manufacturing leads where 31 percent of manufacturing firms experienced expansion in the past 3 years, compared with 24 percent of services firms.

Thus given that informal manufacturing is both the most productive and the sector expanding the fastest, why aren’t these features correlated with income and firm growth, and the creation of more jobs? This conundrum can be understood by unpacking three structural factors that work against the sector: capital, skills and business environment.

In terms of capital, internal funds serve as a source of financing for working capital for 86.8 percent of informal firms. Mainstream financiers, MFIs included, are reluctant to lend to the informal sector. Secondly, informal manufacturers tend to be inadequately skilled in terms of technical skills (i.e. carpentry, welding, use of technology etc), as well as financial and business management skills. Thirdly, informal firms work in a very difficult business environment. They have limited access to land and are targets for bribery and corruption; 60 percent of informal firms report harassment by government officials. The business environment is particularly onerous for informal manufacturers who work in very congested and dilapidated shacks with no protective gear, no water and sanitation systems, unreliable electricity and lighting, and no security provisions.

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(source: http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/image/view/-/1048826/medRes/211419/-/lf43yuz/-/Bd-SMEJuaKali.jpg)

All these factors explain why many firms remain informal and never scale and formalise and thus are stuck in a rut of low productivity and profitability. That said, informal manufacturing is a bright spot in the informal economy and thus can be the starting point for interventions aimed at increasing profitability and productivity. By addressing the three factors of capital, skills and business environment, informal manufacturers which are already star performers in the informal economy, can be an avenue for creating better managed business that generate wealth and employment for the country.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetsew@gmail.com

 

What China’s One Belt, One Road initiative means for Africa

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This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on May 21, 2017

Last week China announced a plan to build a vast global infrastructure network linking Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East into ‘One Belt, One Road’. China plans to spend up to USD 3 trillion on infrastructure in an effort that seems to be centred more on linking 60 countries in the world with China, not necessarily each other. This One Belt initiative is perhaps part of China’s determination to position itself as the world’s leader in the context of Trump’s insular USA. This initiative has two-fold implications for Africa: the opportunities and potential problems that it creates.

One belt, one road

(source: https://qz.com/983581/chinas-new-silk-road-one-belt-one-road-project-has-one-major-pitfall-for-african-countries/)

In terms of opportunity, obviously African needs continued financial support in infrastructure development. The Africa Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that Africa’s infrastructure deficit amounts to USD 93 billion annually until 2021. In this sense any effort to support the development of Africa’s infrastructure is welcome.

Secondly, this is an opportunity for Africa to negotiate the specifics of the type of infrastructure the continent requires and create a win-win situation where Africa leverages Chinese financing to not only address priority infrastructure gaps, but also better interlink the continent.

However there are multiple challenges the first of which is that Europe, India and Japan seem edgy about this initiative and have distanced themselves from it. According to India’s Economic Times, India and Japan are together embarking upon multiple infrastructure projects across Africa and Asia in what could be viewed as pushback against China’s One Belt initiative. The countries have launched their own infrastructure development projects linking Asia-Pacific to Africa to balance China’s influence in the region.

Europe is also edgy because the initiative has not been collaborative and comes across as an edict from China; countries in the initiative were not consulted. Europe is also uneasy with the lack of details and transparency of the initiative seeing it as a new strategy to further enable China to sell Chinese products to the world.

Secondly, analysts have pointed out that from an Africa perspective, the One Belt seems to continue the colonial legacy of building infrastructure to get resources out of the continent, not interlink the continent. Will the initiative entrench Africa’s position as a mere raw material supplier to China and facilitate the natural resource exploitation of the continent?

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(source: africanbusinessmagazine.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Africa-infrastructure-1k.jpg)

Additionally, there are concerns with how the financing will be structured and deployed. Will financing be debt or grants? It can be argued that China needs to increase its free aid toward Africa in order to build its image as a global leader. Further, who will build the infrastructure? Africa has grown weary of China linking its financing to the contracting of Chinese companies. Will this infrastructure drive employ Africans and use African companies? If not, then it can argued that Africa will merely be borrowing money from China to pay itself back.

Linked to the point above, is the fact that Africa is already deeply indebted to China. In Kenya, China owns half of the country’s external debt. Kenya will pay about KES 60 billion to the China Ex-Im Bank alone over the next three years.  Kenya and Africa do not need more debt from China, and if this initiative is primarily debt-financed (in a non-concessionary manner), it will cause considerable concern in African capitals.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetsew@gmail.com

TV Panel interview on food security in Kenya

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On May 15, 2017 I was part of a panel discussing food security in Kenya with a focus on maize.

 

 

The cost of living question in Kenya

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This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on May 14, 2017


Over the past few weeks there has been deep concern voiced by Kenyans with regards to the rising cost of living in the country. Kenyans want to know why their money doesn’t go as far as it used to in the past.

There are several variables at play here the first of which is a no-brainer: the drought. The drought has had the effect of destroying food crops and livestock leading to cuts in the supply of food products. Yet the demand for food expands each year as new Kenyans are born. The drought has created a situation where food demand far outstrips supply leading to an increase in food prices and food price inflation.

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(source: worldteanews.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/WTN161031_KenyaDrought_tumblr_lqip385wlz1r1r5rno1_500-lo-res.jpg)

The second factor at work is the fact that Kenya is an import economy of which food products are a key import. With the strengthening of the dollar as the US economy recovers, the relative depreciation of the shilling (albeit marginal), is making imported goods more expensive and slowly exerting inflationary pressure on food prices.

Thirdly, the interest rate cap has led to a noticeable decline in lending. And although the cap counters inflationary pressure through a contraction in liquidity, the cap means the small loans Kenyans used to qualify for to meet urgent expenses are no longer coming in. As a result, the reduced cash flow for the average Kenyan means that they have to make the little they earn stretch even further as they do not have the cushion of short term loans on which to rely. The effect is that Kenyans feel more broke now than they did last year.

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(source: https://i1.wp.com/chetenet.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Interest-Rate-Caps-Effects.jpg)

Finally, it would not be a stretch to surmise that there are more Kenyan Shillings moving around in the economy due to the election. Money is being spent on election related expenses that are not present during a non-election year. To be clear, there is no hard data on this which is a shame; there should be a study to assess the extent to which election spending pushes up inflation. I raised this concern with an expert a few years ago; I asked him how the government will manage the likely inflation linked to ‘artificial’ election-related spending. He told me that it would correct itself in the medium to long term as that extra liquidity leaves the economy post- election.

The factors detailed above inform why there seems to a money crunch for many Kenyans. And sadly, the interest cap has shut off the tap of liquidity on which Kenyans use to rely in times like this.

The truth of the matter is that there are no quick and ready solutions to this issue and short term remedial action will not address the structural problems of Kenya being an import economy and the ravaging effects of the drought where millions, if not billions, of shillings in agricultural assets have been lost. And since it is an election year, the related spending will continue and there will likely not be the will to reverse the interest rate cap–not until elections are over.

Government and non-government actors should take this time to assess the various issues elucidated above and develop strategies to buffer Kenyans from the confluence of factors currently making life difficult for so many Kenyans.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetsew@gmail.com