Politics

TV Interview: Effect of the elections on the Kenyan economy

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On November 2, 2017 I was part of a panel on Citizen TV that analysed the effects of the elections on the Kenyan economy.

TV Interview: The effect of the elections on the economy

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On September 7 2017, I was on a panel on Citizen TV discussing the effect of the elections on the Kenyan economy.

What to expect in Kenya’s economy in 2016

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This article first appeared in my weekly column with the Business Daily on January 10, 2016

The year 2015 was instructive for the Kenyan economy and government. So what is in store for the economy in 2016? There are key factors that will bolster economic growth as well as factors that may threaten growth.

Inflation

Inflation started inching upward last year and reached 8 percent in December 2015, above the 7.5 percent limit preferred by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK). The bulk of this inflation has been import inflation associated with the KES weakening against the USD pushing up import bills. This spillover effect may continue to drive the cost of imports upward fuelling more rises in inflation. Therefore, the CBK should continue to keep an eye on inflation and take action to pull inflation below the 7.5 percent limit when needed.

(source: http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/01811/inflation_1811026b.jpg)

Interest Rates

Part of the conversation that dominated conversation about the economy at the end of last year was rising interest rates. A combination of factors such as rate hikes to control KES depreciation, aggressive borrowing from government in domestic markets and high T-bill rates contributed to some banks signaling intent to raise rates. Sadly the news does not get better this year; as mentioned, inflation is at 8 percent and as this is above the preferred CBK limit, it is possible that the CBK will raise interest rates to try and manage upward pressure on inflation. Further, as the US economy continues to recover, it may lead to a further strengthening of the dollar against the KES. Thus again, as we saw last year, CBK may raise interest rates to manage KES depreciation against the dollar. In terms of any foreign borrowing in which government would want to engage this year, IMF’s Lagarde makes the point that the increase of interest rates in the USA has already contributed to higher financing costs for some borrowers, including those in emerging and developing markets. Therefore, government should be ready to borrow on more expensive terms in international markets this year. Also bear in mind that government’s management of the Eurobond has negatively impacted investor confidence in government fiscal management; this is likely to translate into more expensive borrowing terms as well.

Intensification of Political Activity

It is almost certain that electioneering will start this year with politicians beginning to build momentum for elections next year. Sadly in Kenya, intensification of political activity tends to be correlated with lower growth. Luckily this is a threat that can be managed if politicians on all sides of the political divide are responsible in comments made and avoid negative political sensationlisation of issues in their bid to garner votes.

Infrastructure

The good news for the economy is that key infrastructure projects are progressing well. In terms of transport infrastructure, the construction of the standard gauge railway in Kenya is ahead of schedule. Further there are updates and expansions in the country’s airports and ports and the tarmacking 10,000 kilometres of new road is ongoing. Secondly, important strides are being made in energy infrastructure; solar power projects will add 1 gigawatt of power to the grid, there is a 310-megawatt wind farm in Lake Turkana as well as the drilling of 20 new geothermal wells. The implications of how such investment, some of which complete this year, could fuel economic growth is apparent.

(source: https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/windustry/pages/433/attachments/original/1437488150/ph2009112004317.jpg?1437488150)

Ease of doing business

Kenya climbed up 21 places on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index to stand at 108 in 2016. This is a positive sign to investors both local and abroad in terms of Kenya’s attractiveness as a business and investment destination. It is important that stakeholders keep the positive momentum going in order to bolster Kenya being perceived as san attractive country in which to invest.

Anzetse Were is a development economist; anzetsew@gmail.com

How opposition parties can drive national growth

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This article firs appeared in by column with the Business Daily on June 7, 2015

All ruling parties and coalitions in healthy democracies have to regularly contend with opposition parties. While the Opposition can play a useful role in ensuring government keeps its commitments to the populace, sometimes it can degenerate into verbal brawls that politicise every issue under the sun and, not always constructively.

It would be useful if the Opposition in Kenya engaged with government in a manner that adds value to the information base of the electorate so as to build a culture of interrogation that goes beyond allegations and counter-allegations.  There are a few core roles that the Opposition could play in building a conversation that drives the country in a better direction in regards to economic development.

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(source: http://www.thenews.pl/21efa430-cfbc-4fb1-914c-ef116613ea3a.file)

One is creating a shadow Cabinet that mirrors the role of Cabinet secretaries of central government ministries pertinent to the economy such as the National Treasury, ministry of Industrialisation and Enterprise Development, ministry of East Africa Affairs, Commerce, and Tourism as well as key economy-related government bodies such as the Central Bank of Kenya.

However, under the current Constitution that is largely presidential, unlike a parliamentary system where ministers are selected from the House—which now makes the Budget—this is currently not very viable.

They can still create something akin to this. There can be a core team of advisors who critique the administration and policies of government in particular departments or portfolio pertinent to economic robustness and development. For example, what is the opposition’s advice and critique on why the value of the Kenya shilling is falling and what should be done to arrest the decline?  How can government effectively service the high levels of foreign-denominated debt it currently holds? How can government manage and eventually reduce the currently prohibitive levels of recurrent expenditure? Even basics should be addressed such as: what should government do to reduce unemployment? How can the upward pressures on the cost of living and inflation be managed? These are all biting questions to which opposition can apply itself.

https://i0.wp.com/www.futurecurrencyforecast.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/kenyan-shilling-1.jpg

(source: http://www.futurecurrencyforecast.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/kenyan-shilling-1.jpg)

To add healthy competition to the mix, the opposition should ideally elect all the members of their shadow teams, with the leader of the opposition perhaps having the final input on who should head the teams. This can be a useful experiment that the opposition can use to test the competence of its members and determine their level of commitment and intellectual dexterity in the docket for which they contested.

Further, this is an effective means through which government can call for engagement and seek specific and constructive input from the opposition in a manner that adds value to the development of the country. The opposition can make clear suggestions to the government with input and new ideas for the benefit of all Kenyans.

https://i2.wp.com/b-i.forbesimg.com/actiontrumpseverything/files/2014/01/1111_idea_380x27821.jpg

(source: http://b-i.forbesimg.com/actiontrumpseverything/files/2014/01/1111_idea_380x27821.jpg)

Ultimately, the point is that there is a clear role for the opposition through which they can take on the government to ensure that promises made are being kept. Creating such teams is an effective means through which the opposition can move away from the current verbal battles that tend to be deeply viral and ethnic-based. The interaction can be more constructive. It’s time to evolve, Kenya.

Ms Were is a development economist. Email: anzetsew@gmail.com; twitter@anzetse

Political factors key in market performance

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This article was first published in the Business Daily on January 18, 2015

In his book The End of the Free Market, Ian Bremmer makes the point that “in emerging markets, political factors still matter— at least as much as economic fundamentals for the performance of markets.”Certain retrogressive practices if left unchanged can harm economic growth by dampening development prospects.The first political factor is tribalism. As a result of divisive ethnic-based politics, the economy continues to suffer consequences of negative ethnicity.The costs of tribalism are numerous.

(source: https://bigambo.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/tribalism.gif)

For example, it leads to sub-optimal allocation in public sector appointments. Because the President is now expected to factor in tribes during decision-making, he does not have the luxury of choosing the best person for the job. Instead he appoints individuals who would be accepted with the least acrimony.This is not to suggest the appointees are incompetent but rather to illustrate how tribal lens affect capacity to ensure the best always manage agencies.Recently it was revealed three tribes hold at least half of all public sector jobs, with some overrepresented compared to their total population.Whether this over representation was deliberate is an issue that disturbs many Kenyans. So strong is tribalism that the Public Service Commission chair said ethnicity is an appointment criterion to ensure all tribes need to be represented fairly.Political and public sectors are at a point where tribe trumps demonstrable skills, professionalism or competence.How can a government run efficiently if tribe rather than aptitude is a key qualification to manage the ministries, Central Bank, parastatals and other agencies that inform growth?

(source:https://mahustlerszone.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/kenya-ethnic-groups.jpg)

Another issue closely linked to ethnicity can be seen in how individuals decide whether to invest in certain regions while shunning others.During the post-election violence in 2008, many flourishing businesses were shut down as owners fled hostile regions.The losses are still being felt by the economy because some entrepreneurs are yet to return. Such tensions have economic costs because ethnicity rather than economic viability informs location.

The second political factor is corruption. The public sector is rife with corruption, brunting the capacity of capital to be employed efficiently to spur growth and development.Transparency International ranks Kenya 136 out of 175 in public sector corruption. Graft is costly as it affects resource allocation in two ways.Firstly, it can change private investors’ assessment of the relative merits of various investments as graft informs changes in comparable prices of goods and services, resources and factors of production.The International Monetary Fund believes if bribery comes into play in enterprise, this lowers investment and retards growth. Ernst and Young reported a third of companies it surveyed paid bribes to win contracts and half of Kenyan CEOs justified the practice.How can resources be allocated efficiently with such shadowy activity?

(source: http://i.bnet.com/blogs/mayers_corruption.jpg)

Secondly, an economic journal shows corruption misallocates resources through decisions on how public funds are invested, or choice of private investments allowed by corrupt agencies.Misallocation comes from possibility of a corrupt decision-maker considering rent-seeking as a key decider.Corruption leads to reduced domestic and foreign direct investment, overblown government expenditure as well as diverting state expenditure away from education, health, and infrastructure towards white elephants.

The third political factor is the public wage bill reportedly now at 53 per cent of the budget, using up 55 per cent of public revenue.This is likely to remain for decades as there is no political will to effect change. Thus, instead of allocating resources to investment or development, we will be busy funding a public sector yet to shun corruption or embrace a culture of efficiency.These political factors cost the economy dearly and their impact must be addressed.

CHINA AND AFRICA: WHAT’S THE DEAL? PART 2…THE PROS AND CONS

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There are pros and cons with regard to Africa’s interaction with China. The discussion here is not exhaustive but is rather aimed at highlighting the salient features that tend to define opinions over Sino-African relations. Let’s look at these arguments.

CHINA-AFRICA

PRO-CHINESE ARGUMENTS

  • China has forgiven African debt

China cancelled debt owed by heavily indebted African countries. In fact, 156 debts owed by 31 heavily indebted African countries totalling 10.5 billion RMB were forgiven by China. This can be seen as an indication that China is interested in Africa’s positive economic growth and development and is not interested in creating dependency and economic slavery of Africa by China.[1]

  • China is creating employment opportunities for Africans

The entrance of China into Africa has created jobs for many Africans. Indeed China seems so committed to this ideal that in 2012, talks between China and Uganda began to promote the transfer of low-value manufacturing jobs to Africa because, ‘China will likely shed some 85 million manufacturing jobs in the coming years because of fast rising wages for unskilled workers’.[2] The two countries launched work to, ‘help African countries seize the opportunity and facilitate the relocation of labor-intensive manufacturing industries (from China) to countries where wage differentials are large enough to ensure competitiveness in global production networks’.  This is another indication that China is committed to ensure its presence in the continent benefits Africa.

  • Some African countries have a trade surplus

Contrary to popular opinion, some African countries actually have a trade surplus with China. At least ten countries including Zambia, Congo Angola, Gabon, and Sudan have a trade surplus with China. Such countries benefit from China’s activities in their countries.

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  • China’s investments are giving Africa the capital and investment the continent needs

It is clear that Africa has been, ‘historically underinvested and underserved by international investors. Chinese capital offers a valuable alternative source of financing to develop the African economy.’[3] China is another valid investment partner that Africa should take seriously. This point is particularly pertinent given that in Africa, ‘most resources-rich states are in dire need of infrastructure development and support’.[4] Why should China refrain from improving the dilapidated infrastructure of so many African states? Because there may be challenges? Note that investment in infrastructure and other projects will arguably serve Africa for decades in the future…whether the Chinese are still active on the continent or not.

  • China invests where no one else is willing to invest

Linked to the point above is the fact that not only does China invest where Africa needs it to invest, it invests in high-risk areas where no one else is willing to go. Indeed there is empirical evidence that Chinese firms are less adverse to political risk compared to Western counterparts.[5] State Owned Enterprises are particularly risk friendly and, ‘may not behave solely as profit maximizers. Thanks to the financial support of Chinese state banks, they might indeed be able to undertake higher risks’.[6] Thus, ‘Through significant investment in a continent known for its political and social risks, China has helped many African countries develop their nascent sectors’.[7] Due to this, ‘China can promote economic projects in areas in Africa deemed too risky or unfeasible by other governments or multinational corporations’.[8] Why would Africa reject much-needed investment into areas that desperately need it? This indicates that China, in some ways, is perhaps the main country on which Africa can rely to develop areas that have been neglected for so long. Such engagement ought to be encouraged.

china_africa_1107 (1)

  • Africa exports a meagre amount of oil and minerals to China when compared to other countries

The standard argument is that 1) China is resource hungry and 2) Africa is exporting huge amounts oils and minerals to China to ‘feed the dragon’ and this is creating dependency. However, the following must be noted: [9]

–       China still produces much of the oil it consumes

–       China imports most of its oil from the Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq), Asia (Russia), Latin America (Brazil, Venezuela), and North America (Canada). Indeed for China, the Middle East remains the most important source for oil.

China is not singling out Africa for its resource needs. Africa is merely one of China’s many trading partners and Africa has good reason to meet such resource requirements like any other pragmatic trading partner would do.

  • Growing positive effect of Chinese diplomacy in Africa

Initially China declared a, ‘respect for the sovereignty of other nations and pledged to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of other countries’. This gained heated criticism because ongoing Chinese investments in certain countries were seen as encouraging the continued existence of rogue African states which had (have) dictatorial regimes with poor human rights records. Countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe were mentioned often during such criticisms. Recently however China’s, ‘actions demonstrate a more proactive involvement on the African continent’.[10] In the case of North and South Sudan for example, in 2011 tensions between the two parties reached a near breaking point until China sent their envoy for African affairs to intervene in the matter. He managed to break the deadlock. In addition to this, ‘China supported the UN resolutions for peacekeeping missions in Darfur, and has sent several hundred troops to the region’.[11] Therefore, there seems to be an evolution towards a more positive proactive role in China’s political interaction with Africa that ought to be noted.

1337165711HuAfrica

  • Steps by China to protect Africa’s environment

It is generally NOT known that, ‘China is a world leader in renewable energy technologies – a much needed energy technology for both urban and rural communities in Africa’.[12] In addition to this, Chinese energy- efficient products have proven to be more affordable than Western products thereby making them more accessible to the African market. Further, technical assistance from China to Africa exists and is not only addressing environmental issues in Africa, it is also building the ability of Africans to better manage their ecosystems. China in conjunction with UNEP have a joint program to, ‘build the capacity of African countries in the fields of ecosystem management, disaster reduction, climate change adaptation and renewable energy’.[13] Therefore, it can be said that the perception that China is an environmental monster in Africa is not fully accurate…some positive acting in this field continues to happen.

  • China is treating Africa better than EuroAmerica did

It should be borne in mind that Europe and North America, often the harshest critics of China’s activities in Africa, have a very dark history with the continent with imbalances that continue to this day. Slavery and colonialism were crimes against humanity and continued in Africa for eons. Furthermore, the disastrous Structural Adjustment Programs introduced by EuroAmerican institutions in the past are often seen as having had dire consequences on African welfare. Trade imbalances between the two players continue to this day as seen in the failure of the Doha round of talks. In fact, the negative experiences African governments suffered at the hands of EuroAmerica have made Africans tougher negotiators and bargainers when interacting with China. African governments are learning from past mistreatment and mistakes. Further, Africa is no longer what it used to be. For example, opening a mine in Africa today is, ‘not so easy any more, you need to take into account the environment, local employment and benefits to local economy’.[14] Africa has learnt from the past. In fact it can be argued that China is getting a tougher time in Africa because of past injustices suffered at the hands of EuroAmerica. This is why some view China as the better option for Africa. China has a much cleaner record of interaction with the continent and given that Africans are now wiser, Africa stands to benefit a great deal from engagements with China.

These points indicate that China’s interaction with the continent has positive elements that should not be skimmed over or ignored.

angolan-chinese-engineers[1]

ANTI-CHINESE ARGUMENTS

 However, there are criticisms to China’s engagement with Africa.

  • Imbalanced trade

Although it is true that some African nations have a trade surplus with China, Africa as a whole does not. By 2008, Africa had a USD10 billion trade deficit with China.[15] This is particularly pertinent when one considers that, China-Africa trade, ‘represents close to 10 percent of the continent‘s exports and imports’.  Further, China continues to import basic raw materials from Africa, ‘Approximately 70 percent of registered African exports to China consist of crude oil and 15 percent of raw materials’.[16]

Chinese imports from Africa

sino-african-bilateral-trade

This continues to relegate Africa to being a mere provider of unprocessed goods with little value addition. If China were truly pro-Africa, surely it would seek to address such imbalances.

  • China’s political interaction with African nations

As indicated previously, China’s non-interference policy with African nations has been subject to negative criticism. Although there are certain indications that China may be taking a more positive role in Africa, certain actions continue to be negative. For example, ‘In Zimbabwe, China delivered propaganda bearing the insignia of Robert Mugabe’s incumbent political party prior to the 2005 election…The Chinese are reported to have offered Mugabe jamming devices to use against pro-opposition radio stations.’[17] Further China continues sell arms to African nations, even those with regimes the international community consider problematic such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.[18] If China truly had African welfare in mind, it is argued, it would not engage in such delinquent behaviour.

  • Environmental degradation

Chinese investments in environmentally sensitive sectors, including forestry, agriculture, fishing, oil and gas, have spurred anti-Chinese sentiment in many African countries. Chinese mining projects have also caused serious environmental problems, and demand in Asia for rhino horn and ivory has spurred the illegal wildlife trade in Africa.[19] Kenya has been particularly bad hit with the poaching of rhino and elephant horns and tusks this year to the extent that, ‘Tour operators and tourist hotel owners want the Kenya government to impose sanctions against Asian countries where trade in animal trophies is rampant…Increased poaching has been blamed on the demand for ivory in Middle East and China’.[20] In 2012 Kenya lost 384 elephants and 29 rhinos to poachers.[21]

Other examples abound of Chinese companies destroying Africa’s environment, for example a state-owned oily company created lakes of spilled crude in Sudan. In another example, Ghanaians say that not only are the Chinese destroying their environment, they are illegally taking over land. One villager said, ‘The Chinese destroyed our land and our river, they are sitting there with pick-ups and guns, plenty of guns…They operate big machines and it makes it very difficult to reclaim the land for farming when they are done.[22], [23]  Such transgressions make the Chinese look like they have absolutely no regard for African welfare at all.

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  • Poor working environment for Africans

Reports of poor labour conditions for African in Chinese activities are also rife, ‘At Chinese-run mines in Zambia’s copper belt they (Africans) must work for two years before they get safety helmets. Ventilation below ground is poor and deadly accidents occur almost daily. To avoid censure, Chinese managers bribe union bosses and take them on “study tours” to massage parlours in China….Workers who assemble in groups are violently dispersed. When cases end up in court, witnesses are intimidated’.[24]  To add insult to injury Chinese on the continent have killed Africans over labour-related disputes, ‘Chinese mine managers shot and wounded 11 of their employees in southern Zambia over a pay dispute, sparking a countrywide outrage’.[25]  Such allowances are simply unacceptable and create just anger in Africans who resent being so poorly treated on their own continent.

 

  • Bringing in employment from China

There is concern that, ‘Chinese infrastructure projects often import Chinese labour rather than developing local skills’.[26] The reality is that, ‘Chinese migration has followed in the wake of their country’s involvement in the local economies’.[27]  Although, generally speaking, more Africans than Chinese are employed, significant numbers of Chinese come in and there is concern that they are doing jobs that could be done by Africans. Look at these numbers: [28]

–    2011: Rwanda- Huawei is maintaining its project handed over in 2007 with 30 Chinese and 17 local technicians.

–    2010: Angola- China Railway 20 Bureau Group rehabilitation of 540 km of the Benguela Railway between Munhango and Luau, employing 300 Chinese technicians and 300 Angolans.

–    2010: Mozambique stadium- 500 Chinese, 1000 Mozambicans.

–    2010: Luanda stadium, Angola- 700 Chinese, 250 Angolans

Click here for more info. This pattern has disgruntled many Africans, particularly due to the fact that all the low-skill jobs are saddled on Africans while technical and management positions are reserved for the Chinese. This leads to the next point.

  • Even if jobs are created, they are of poor quality

Even in cases when China does create jobs for Africans, they are usual only for cheap, unskilled labour. For example, ‘Algerians are employed on construction sites as cheap local labour. Educated Algerians do not seem to have much access to Chinese companies’.[29] The extent to which this is replicated in Africa is not clear, however a casual look at sites managed by Chinese often have Africans as the cheap labour while the Chinese manage and supervise.

  • Racial tensions

Africans should not deceive themselves into thinking that merely due to the fact that both Africa and China have a history of struggle against Western imperialism and racism, this confers some immunity against racism to the Chinese. It does not. All signs seem to point to the fact that anti-black racism amongst Chinese is rife. For example, ‘Liberian student David Johnson moved to China just two months ago. He said he has already been subjected to several racist remarks. “One time I was walking down the street and someone called me a stupid black c***,” he reported’.[30] In fact when Chinese men were asked, ‘what they think about black women, many smiled and said they prefer white women, but black women with whiter skin are OK. They can “try one for fun.”’.[31] The reality is that, ‘Non-white foreigners, especially black people, are likely to face more obstacles in China as many Chinese see them as inferior’.[32] And this is not a recent phenomenon, ‘this kind of racism dates back to when Africans were first welcomed into China to study at Chinese universities in the 1960s. And in 1988, a violent, 300-strong mob broke into an African students’ dormitory at Nanjing University and destroyed their possessions while chanting “down with the black devils”.’[33] Some Africans need to get their blinders off for this one. Anti-black racism is a reality to contend with in Sino-African relations.

NIGGER-KING-STORE

 So what should Africa do to take control of and manage this growing relationship in a manner that is favourable to Africa? The next post will be on recommendations for Africa. At the core of these recommendation is the thought that, ‘Africa must not be too Westwards or Eastwards minded- but rather Inwards minded. It is within Africa that all the answers lie’.[34]


[1] Wenping, He, ‘China’s Diplomacy in Africa’, http://www.african-bulletin.com/doc/wenpingc.pdf

[2] Tentena, Paul (2012), ‘Africa: China to Create 85 Million Jobs for Africa’, All Africa, http://allafrica.com/stories/201203261325.html

[3] Cheung, Yin- Wong, Jakob De Haan, Xingwang Qian And Shu Yu(2011), China’s Outward Direct Investment In Africa, Hong Kong Institute For Monetary Research.

[4] Cheung, Yin- Wong, Jakob De Haan, Xingwang Qian And Shu Yu(2011), China’s Outward Direct Investment In Africa, Hong Kong Institute For Monetary Research.

[5] Belligoli, Serena (2011), ‘ Chinese Investments on the African Continent and Political Risk: the Ongoing Debate in China’, Journal of Cambridge Studies, http://journal.acs-cam.org.uk/data/archive/2012/201203-article8.pdf

[6] Belligoli, Serena (2011), ‘ Chinese Investments on the African Continent and Political Risk: the Ongoing Debate in China’, Journal of Cambridge Studies, http://journal.acs-cam.org.uk/data/archive/2012/201203-article8.pdf

[7] Alessi, Christopher, and Stephanie Hanson (2012), ‘Expanding China-Africa Oil Ties’, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/expanding-china-africa-oil-ties/p9557

[8] Zhao, Shelly (2011), ‘The Geopolitics of China-African Oil’, China Briefing http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2011/04/13/the-geopolitics-of-china-african-oil.html

[9] Zhao, Shelly (2011), ‘The Geopolitics of China-African Oil’, China Briefing http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2011/04/13/the-geopolitics-of-china-african-oil.html

[10] Parenti, Jennifer (2012), ‘China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century’, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-52/23.pdf

[11] Green, James (2012), ‘China in Sudan and South Sudan: an Unlikely Mediator?’, Think Africa Press, http://thinkafricapress.com/south-sudan/china-sudan-and-south-sudan-unlikely-intervention

[13] UNEP, ‘UNEP – China – Africa Cooperation On The Environment’, http://www.unep.org/roa/portals/137/docs/UNEP-China%20flyer-WEB.pdf

[14] Becker, Antoaneta (2011), ‘China’s changing tone on African investment’, Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201167142556551565.html

[15] The African Development Bank Group (2010), ‘Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa’, Policy Brief , http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Chinese%20Trade%20%20Investment%20Activities%20in%20Africa%2020Aug.pdf

[16]The African Development Bank Group (2010), ‘Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa’, Policy Brief , http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Chinese%20Trade%20%20Investment%20Activities%20in%20Africa%2020Aug.pdf

[17] Parenti, Jennifer (2012), ‘China-Africa Relations in the 21st Century’, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-52/23.pdf

[18] Zhao, Shelly (2011), ‘The Geopolitics of China-African Oil’, China Briefing http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2011/04/13/the-geopolitics-of-china-african-oil.html

[19] Van Sant, Shannon (2012), ‘Africans Urge China to Help Create Sustainable Development’, VOA, http://www.voanews.com/content/africans_urge_china_to_help_creating_sustainable_development_in_africa/1443475.html

[20] Kitimo, Anthony (2013), ‘Tour operators want Asian states sanctioned over wildlife trade’, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Tour-operators-want-Asian-states-sanctioned-over-wildlife-trade/-/539546/1685288/-/15lgk19z/-/index.html

[21] Opiyo, Dave (2012), ‘Wildlife count on way as poaching rises’, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/1690230/-/x60v4nz/-/index.html

[22] The Economist (2011), ‘Trying to pull together’, http://www.economist.com/node/18586448

[23] Bax, Pauline (2012), ‘Ghana’s Gold Sparks Conflict With Illegal Chinese Miners’, Bloomberg,

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-10-07/ghana-s-gold-sparks-conflict-with-illegal-chinese-miners

[24] The Economist (2011), ‘Trying to pull together’, http://www.economist.com/node/18586448

[26] Grammaticas, David, ‘Chinese colonialism?’,  BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18901656

[27] The African Development Bank Group (2010), ‘Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa’, Policy Brief , http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Chinese%20Trade%20%20Investment%20Activities%20in%20Africa%2020Aug.pdf

[28] Brautigam, Deborah (2011) ‘ Chinese Workers in Africa’, http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/p/chinese-workers-in-africa-anecdotes.html

[29] The African Development Bank Group (2010), ‘Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in Africa’, Policy Brief , http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Chinese%20Trade%20%20Investment%20Activities%20in%20Africa%2020Aug.pdf

[30] Jaffe, Gabrielle ‘Tinted prejudice in China’, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/24/world/asia/china-tinted-prejudice

[31] Global Times Community (2012), ‘Racism still obstacle for blacks in China’, http://community.globaltimes.cn/portal.php?mod=view&aid=1521

[32] Global Times Community (2012), ‘Racism still obstacle for blacks in China’, http://community.globaltimes.cn/portal.php?mod=view&aid=1521

[33] Jaffe, Gabrielle ‘Tinted prejudice in China’, CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/24/world/asia/china-tinted-prejudice

[34] Obadias Ndaba (2012), ‘Why China Will Not Solve Africa’s Problems’, The African Executive, http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=6753

BRAZIL AND AFRICA: WHAT’S THE DEAL?

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The interaction between Brazil and Africa is coming to increasingly closer scrutiny as the continent that was once labelled the ‘dark continent’ has now been labelled the ‘hopeful continent’[1]. Burgeoning African economies are being called ‘Lion economies’ insinuating the potential and interest that the Asian ‘Tiger economies’ raised in the past; Brazil is but one interested party in the continent. However what is the nature of the interaction between Africa and Brazil? And can Africa truly benefit from this growing relationship?

Africa and Brazil are linked by the sad and brutal reality of the Brazilian Slave Trade that started around 1550 and ended in the late 1800s. Over the course of this barbaric affair, during which Africans were treated as nothing but plantation fodder, it is estimated that over 3 million Africans were forcefully migrated into Brazil. There are now over a staggering 190 million black or mixed race blacks in Brazil making up 50.7% of a total population[2]. Despite this significant historical connection, Brazil’s official political and economic relationship with Africa has been anything but steadfast and interested. There has been a blend of distancing and rapprochement by the consecutive Brazilian governments towards Africa. It was mainly under Lula Di Silva’s tenure that Brazilo-African relations were truly brought to focus by the Brazilian government. Indeed, Lula’s administration (2003- 2010), ‘revived Brazil’s interest in Africa and set it on a surer footing, as part of the search to extend Brazil’s global influence’[3].   So serious was Lula’s interest in Africa that, ‘one of his first acts of office was a federal decree that made the study of African history and African and Afro-Brazilian culture mandatory at all levels of Brazil’s national curriculum’.[4] Lula was also outspoken with regard to Africa’s political position in the world seen in 2011 when he stated that, ‘It isn’t possible that the African continent, with 53 countries, has no permanent representation on the Security Council…(The west) is unable to see an Africa that is composed of human beings equal to those on the European continent’ [5]. During his tenure, Lula, spoke of, ‘Brazil’s “historic debt” to the continent stating that, ‘Brazilian society was built on the work, the sweat and the blood of Africans,’ and for that reason, Brazil ‘is in debt to Africa’[6], [7].

GROWING ECONOMIC CONNECTIONS

Lula’s rhetoric aside, there are very concrete economic connections that have made between Africa and Brazil, especially under his administration.

‘Brazil’s trade with Africa increased between 2000 and 2010 from US$4 billion to US$20 billion’[8]. In terms of FDI, the Brazilian government has been prioritizing FDI in Africa and increased FDI from about US$69 billion in 2001 to US$214 billion in 2009[9].

Source: World Resources Institute

Brazilian companies of significant scale have been moving into Africa, for example:

  • Mining giant Vale is to invest a total of $15-20 billion in Africa within the next five years [10]
  • Infrastructure firm Odebrecht operates in several African countries and in 2009, Africa accounted for $2.427 billion in revenues for the group, or about 10 percent of its earnings[11]
  • Oil company Petrobras plans to invest some $3 billion in Africa from now until 2013[12].
  • By September 2007 Brazil’s National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) had approved 29 projects in Africa worth $742 million. [13]

 

GROWING POLITICAL CONNECTIONS

In addition to these economic ventures, political connections between Brazil and Africa have been burgeoning in recent times. For example, in 2003 the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), was created. IBSA is a multilateral initiative which, among other things, has a Fund for Poverty Alleviation, the first initiative of cooperation for development on the basis of a trilateral South-South cooperation. 

Another, somewhat informal but potentially formidable political connection which is linked to IBSA developed in 2003 when Brazil played a key role in the creation of the developing countries’ ‘Group of 21’ (G21). G21 is essentially a collection of developing countries that seek to get more favourable trade deals with the economic powers of the global north and is testament to the fact that, ‘Developing countries have woken up to their negotiating power… and are trying to make the WTO work for the poor despite the best efforts of the EU and US to frustrate them’[14]. Though not formally recognised, such political alliances between Brazil and African nations may prove to be of significant use for both.  In addition to these, Brazil has demonstrated interest in forging ties with ECOWAS, the Economic Commission of West African States and welcomed several African nations into what used to be the exclusively South American economic and political club, Mercosur’ [15].

All of these political and economic bonds that are being forged between Africa and Brazil speak to the recent focus Brazil has had for Africa. However, it is important to note that most of these initiatives were taken under Lula’s administration which has since been replaced. That said, it appears as though Lula’s legacy with Africa is going to be respected by the new Rousseff administration. Indeed, ‘Under the leadership of President Lula da Silva, ties between Brazil and Africa deepened and under the new Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, these ties are continuing to strengthen’.[16] This interest is being echoed by African governments who, ‘have continued to engage and deepen partnership with Brazil’[17].

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Another interesting angle through which one can analyse Brazilo-African relationship is through development assistance. It is important to note that Brazil is not a loud development partner that has high profile organisations and programs in the tradition of EuroAmerican development assistance. Rather, ‘Without attracting much attention, Brazil is fast becoming one of the world’s biggest providers of help to poor countries’[18]. But how exactly does Brazil implement its development assistance?

Technical cooperation

So far, ‘Brazilian assistance programs have focused on technical cooperation in developing countries’[19]. Indeed, ‘Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have requested cooperation from Brazil in five key areas: tropical agriculture, tropical medicine, vocational training (to support the industrial sector), energy, and social protection’[20]. These areas probably reflect the relevance of Brazilian expertise for Africa since in reality, ‘Brazil is simultaneously a developed country and a developing country, a donor and a recipient of development aid’[21]. Therefore there are areas of similarity where Brazil can understand where Africa is, what the challenges are and possible areas of strategic collaboration. Indeed, ‘Brazil’s development projects are mainly based on concepts that have already been implemented at home’ and therefore one can argue Brazil has practical experience that Africa can draw on[22].

Financial interventions: concessional loans, debt relief

In terms of the financial instruments that Brazil uses in it development assistance arsenal it, ‘provides concessional loans and debt relief to developing countries’ with, ‘Brazilian debt relief to the continent exceeding US$1 billion[23], [24]. Although there is not much published on concessional loans, Brazil has given significant debt relief packages to some African nations. For example, ‘under the HIPC initiative, Brazil forgave $369 million of Mozambique’s debt as well as smaller amounts owed by Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau’[25].  Brazil has also unofficially waived $240 million of Tanzania’s debt[26]. In addition to these, Brazil ‘renegotiated several African nations’ debt during the Lula administrations…This financial action exceeded US$1 billion and accounted for almost 75 percent of the total debt renegotiated by the Lula administrations’[27] .

Such steps in development assistance seem to be practical, targeted and relevant to Africa. They are bound to encourage African governments to draw closer to Brazil as they seem to indicate that Brazil is genuinely interested in propelling the continent’s growth.

RACE, ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND RELATED COMPLEXITIES

However, although there is a growing interest in the Brazilo-African connection, there are complexities that inform this interaction as well, some less positively than others.

Race: The Afro-Brazilian experience

It is well documented that the attitude towards blacks in Brazil leaves a lot to be desired, ‘Economic and educational disadvantages, combined with the system of alliances, bargaining, and patronage that (has) recruited the political and diplomatic elites, marginalized Brazilians of African descent and deprived them of the benefits of modernity and progress. Such obstacles needed to be removed, rather than deepened’[28]. Since most of Africa is black, one wonders the extent to which this problematic aspect of Brazilian culture will inform the manner through which Brazil interacts with Africa. Bear in mind that, some in Brazil already view investment in Africa as, ‘wasting money in a continent without future’ and view Africa as a colossal failure that cannot be salvaged[29]. Will such sentiment on the domestic front affect the extent to which the Brazilian government can continue to positively engage with Africa?

History of anti-imperialist theoretical development

On the other hand, one can argue that Brazil is genuine in its action to draw closer to Africa; indeed it can be seen to have feelings of solidarity with Africa. Infact, ‘Brazilian diplomats claim that its development aid has not been linked to the country’s political and commercial interests, but guided by solidarity’[30]. Brazil has a rich history of anti-colonial and anti-imperialistic theorists such as Paulo Freire, as well as those who analysed race and class in Brazil such as Clovis Moura, Florestan Fernandes and Octávio Ianni. These are topics and issues that Africa itself resonates with as seen in the works of individuals such as Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, Ngugi Wa’Thiongo and Thomas Sankara. So it can be argued that there are solid grounds for a genuine feelings of solidarity between the Brazil and Africa as they have both gone through and overcome colonialism and continue to address the social problems and challenges that it created.

RESPONSE TO BRAZIL’S ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA

Anti-Africa arguments

Given this renewed interest, many ask what the true intentions driving Brazil’s renewed interest in Africa are. Some argue that Brazil’s emerging role as a medium-sized power is the reason why it has ‘begun rejuvenating the nation’s relations with the African continent’[31].  Brazil sees Africa as a power that can enhance its global positioning as a force to be reckoned with.

Others argue that economics drives this renewal and that Brazil is engaged in, ‘soft imperialism’ in that the, ‘Brazilian business community wants to make profit where it is possible, especially in the new markets’[32]. Indeed some argue that, ‘A key aim of Brazilian foreign policy under Lula…has been to reduce Brazilian vulnerability on the international stage’ by engaging in a more ‘muscular foreign policy’ to pursue its interests’[33]. Therefore, there is no real desire to help Africa develop economically but rather it is the capitalistic ambition driving Brazil’s renewed interaction with Africa. It can be argued that, ‘An economic goal of Brazilian foreign policy is the development of new export markets to create employment within the country (Brazil) in order to reduce poverty’[34]. After all, one can observe that some of the patterns of trade between Africa and Brazil echo that between Euro-America and Africa; a preponderance of Africa’s export of raw materials. Note, ‘More than 80 percent of Brazil’s imports from the African continent are mineral products and crude materials (oil and gas)[35]. This may indicate that Brazil is note interested in driving any structural economic change in either African trade patterns nor in Africa’s position in the global economic order. It seems content with the status-quo that keeps Africa at the bottom of the economic pile as the supplier of raw materials. In addition, most of Brazil’s economic engagement is with a handful of natural resource-rich African nations, ‘Brazil’s major trading partners in Africa are Nigeria (32 percent), Angola (16 percent), Algeria (12percent), South Africa (10 percent), and Libya (7 percent). Together these countries make up 77 percent of its total trade with the continent’[36]. Therefore, it can be argued that Africa as whole is truly benefiting from this trade.

Another concern with Brazil’s interaction with Africa is its biofuel agenda. Indeed, Brazil’s push for biofuel has registered concern with some whom argue that in a continent, ‘That suffers persistent hunger, using millions of hectares of agricultural land to grow crops to power European cars is immoral and perverse’ [37]. The core concern here is that Brazil seems to advocating for the use of arable land for generating renewable fuel sources thereby risking a loss of much needed arable land and a likely hike in food prices. This is surely set to worsen Africa’s already fragile food (in)security position. Further, targeting Africa for biofuel production makes Brazil a mere addition to one of the many foreign parties engaged in the ongoing scuffle for African land[38].

 

Pro-Africa argument

However, there is another side to this equation because, as explored earlier, Africa can draw direct relevance from Brazil to Africa not only because Brazil has a tropical climate like Africa, but Brazil is also partly a developing country which, like Africa, has areas with dire poverty and a growing divide between rich and poor. Brazil’s technical know-how can thus arguably be effectively used in Africa in areas such as tropical agriculture, medicine, renewable energy, social protection and vocational training. Lessons drawn from Brazil may well be more relevant than those drawn from EuroAmerica.

Secondly, as stated, Brazil has demonstrated support for Africa’s economic growth through its action on trade and debt. Further, ‘Brazil is being utilized by African governments to counter the European infrastructural economic domination’[39]. Brazil gives Africans an alternative social and economic development partner to the EuroAmerican parties which have dominated Africa for so long.

THE CONUNDRUM TO SOLVE

Regardless of what position one takes, there is an interesting tension in this relationship. Firstly, on one hand, the motivation for Brazil’s interaction with Africa can be seen to be pure self-interest with Brazil pursuing Africa for the economic and political benefits it will gain due to this relationship. At the same time, there are genuine common points of agreement and solidarity between Africa and Brazil, especially on economic issues and the attitude the EuroAmerica has towards trade and debt with regard to poor countries. So there is pure self-interest as well as genuine solidarity informing Brazil’s continued pursuit of relations with Africa. It will be interesting to see how these opposing motivations will inform Brazil’s engagement with Africa.

Secondly, further interwoven into this conundrum, is the fact that on one hand Brazil is pro-EuroAmerican as it develops and seeks to expand interaction with this bloc in order to develop economically, using the capitalist model. It thus seeks to draw from the experience and expertise EuroAmerica has in this field. The concurrent reality is that Brazil, as mentioned earlier, has stood and will likely continue to stand in solidarity with Africa in what can be seen as Africa’s ‘anti-EuroAmerican’ positions on trade and debt. Due to asymmetry in the global capitalistic system, African nations openly condemn the trade policies and economic behaviour that EuroAmerica has with and towards them. Therefore, on one hand Brazil in pro-EuroAmerican and seeks to build ties with them for its economic benefit and on the other hand it is anti-EuroAmerican as it seeks to address the global economic asymmetry. Ergo, there is a perplexing internal contradiction Brazil has with regard to EuroAmerica of which it needs to be aware. This contradiction is one that African nations ought to be aware of and use it inform their interaction with Brazil such that they benefit from it.

HOW CAN AFRICA BENEFIT

The bottom line question is: what can Africa do to ensure it benefits from Brazil’s interest in Africa?

Short term

In the short term, Africa can do the following:

  • Insist that locals are hired for Brazilian projects in Africa. This will increase the likelihood of a transfer of skills and wealth on a basic level at the very least.
  • Make use of the conundrum described above and build solidarity with Brazil and use its bargaining power to ensure that where possible, Brazil supports Africa’s position particularly in the context of global interactions on trade and debt.
  • Continue to use Brazil’s development assistance and draw on Brazil’s experience to the fullest extent possible with regard to developing and strengthening vocational educational institutions in Africa, improving agriculture, developing social protection programs and the development of renewable energy options. Africa should take advantage of the huge skills transfer possibilities these opportunities present.

Long term

In the long term, Africa should:

  • Build positive cultural ties with Brazil particularly in light of the significant Afro-Brazilian population. In this way Africa can begin to exert its own influence in Brazil.
  • Continue to push for and consolidate Brazil as an ally to Africa with regard to getting fairer trade terms in global trade discussions
  • Use Brazil’s technical cooperation activities to build a manufacturing base for value addition in Africa
  • Support Brazil in building South-South cooperation so that many African nations can benefit from their knowledge and expertise as well
  • Learn from how Brazil works in some African countries and implement relevant and successful elements to other African countries. In this light, encourage exchange-tours between African countries on activities done in conjunction with Brazil.
  • Encourage the development of dialogue between Africa-wide institutions such as the African Union and the African Development Bank and Brazil.

[1] Economist, The (2011), ‘The hopeful continent: Africa rising’, http://www.economist.com/node/21541015

[2] 2011, Góes, Paul, ‘Brazil: Census “Reveals” Majority of Population is Black or Mixed Race’,  http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/11/29/brazil-census-black-mixed-population

[3] World Bank (2011), Bridging the Atlantic-  Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South–South Partnering for Growth , http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/africa-brazil-bridging-final.pdf

[4] Pham, Peter (2010), ‘Brazil Expanding Links in Africa: Lula’s Positive Legacy’, http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.7624/pub_detail.asp

[5] Karpova, Lisa (trans.) (2011), ‘Lula criticizes UN, West at African Union summit, http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/terror/08-07-2011/118436-Lula_criticizes_UN_West_at_summit-0/

[6] The African Development Bank Group (2011), ‘Brazil’s Economic Engagement with Africa’ Africa Economic Brief (Volume 2, Issue 5) http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Brazil%27s_Economic_Engagement_with_Africa_rev.pdf

[7] Harsch, Ernest (2004), ‘Brazil repaying its ‘debt’ to Africa’ http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no4/174brazil.htm

[8] The African Development Bank Group (2011), ‘Brazil’s Economic Engagement with Africa’ Africa Economic Brief (Volume 2, Issue 5)

[9] World Bank (2011), Bridging the Atlantic-  Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South–South Partnering for Growth , http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/africa-brazil-bridging-final.pdf

[10] Lewis, David (2011), ‘In Africa, Brazil takes a different track’, Reuters http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/specials/Brazil%20in%20Africa.pdf

[11] Lewis, David (2011), ‘In Africa, Brazil takes a different track’, Reuters http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/specials/Brazil%20in%20Africa.pdf

[12] Biofuels Digest (2010), ‘ Brazil, Petrobas spreading bioenergy tentacles across Africa’http://biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2010/06/10/brazil-petrobras-spreading-bioenergy-tentacles-across-africa/

[13]Seibert, Gerhard (2011), ‘Brazil in Africa: Ambitions and Achievements of an Emerging Regional Power in the Political and Economic Sector’ http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/1-20/panel-8/Gerhard-Seibert-Full-paper.pdf

[14] The Guardian (2003), ‘G21 alliance of the poor fights subsidies deal’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2003/sep/15/2

[15] ECOWAS Press Release (2010). ‘Ecowas, Brazil Agree New Initiatives To Bolster Their Collaboration’, http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=105&lang=en&annee=2010

[16] World Bank (2011), Bridging the Atlantic-  Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South–South Partnering for Growth , http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/africa-brazil-bridging-final.pdf

[17] Ibid

[18] Economist, The, ‘Speak softly and carry a blank cheque’, http://www.economist.com/node/16592455

[19] Yonemura, Akemi(2010), ‘A Brave New World of ‘Emerging’, ‘Non-DAC’ Donors and their Differences from Traditional Donors’, http://www.norrag.org/issues/article/1330/en/brazil-in-africa.html

[20] World Bank (2011), Bridging the Atlantic-  Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South–South Partnering for Growth , http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/africa-brazil-bridging-final.pdf

[21] Seibert, Gerhard (2011), ‘Brazil in Africa: Ambitions and Achievements of an Emerging Regional Power in the Political and Economic Sector’, http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/1-20/panel-8/Gerhard-Seibert-Full-paper.pdf

[22] Seibert, Gerhard (2011), ‘Brazil in Africa: Ambitions and Achievements of an Emerging Regional Power in the Political and Economic Sector’, http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/1-20/panel-8/Gerhard-Seibert-Full-paper.pdf

[23] The African Development Bank Group (2011), ‘Brazil’s Economic Engagement with Africa’ Africa Economic Brief (Volume 2, Issue 5)

[24] [24] World Bank (2011), Bridging the Atlantic-  Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South–South Partnering for Growth , http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/africa-brazil-bridging-final.pdf

[25] ONE (2010), ‘The Data Report’, http://www.one.org/report/2010/en/country/emerging/brazil.html

[26] Embassy of Dar Es Salaam (Tanzania) (2010) ‘Exports Key To Tanzania’s Debt Sustainability’ http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=06DARESSALAAM1483

[27] World Bank (2011), Bridging the Atlantic-  Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South–South Partnering for Growth , http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/africa-brazil-bridging-final.pdf

[28] World Bank (2011), Bridging the Atlantic-  Brazil and Sub-Saharan Africa: South–South Partnering for Growth , http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/africa-brazil-bridging-final.pdf

[29] Visentini, Paulo Fagundes (2009), ‘Prestige diplomacy, southern solidarity or “soft imperialism”?Lula’s Brazil-Africa relations (2003 onwards)’ http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/seminarvisentini.pdf

[30] Seibert, Gerhard (2011), ‘Brazil in Africa: Ambitions and Achievements of an Emerging Regional Power in the Political and Economic Sector’, http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/1-20/panel-8/Gerhard-Seibert-Full-paper.pdf

[31] Doelling , Rachel (2008), ‘Brazil’s Contemporary Foreign Policy towards Africa’, Journal Of International Relations (Vol. 10)

[32] Visentini, Paulo Fagundes (2009), ‘Prestige diplomacy, southern solidarity or “soft imperialism”?Lula’s Brazil-Africa relations (2003 onwards)’ http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/seminarvisentini.pdf

[33] Alden, Christoper (2011), ‘Emerging Powers and Africa’, http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SU004/alden.pdf

[34] Seibert, Gerhard (2011), ‘Brazil in Africa: Ambitions and Achievements of an Emerging Regional Power in the Political and Economic Sector’, http://www.nai.uu.se/ecas-4/panels/1-20/panel-8/Gerhard-Seibert-Full-paper.pdf

[35] The African Development Bank Group (2011), ‘Brazil’s Economic Engagement with Africa’ Africa Economic Brief (Volume 2, Issue 5), http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Brazil%27s_Economic_Engagement_with_Africa_rev.pdf

[36] The African Development Bank Group (2011), ‘Brazil’s Economic Engagement with Africa’ Africa Economic Brief (Volume 2, Issue 5), http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Brazil%27s_Economic_Engagement_with_Africa_rev.pdf

[37] BusinessWeek (2010), ‘Critics Slam EU-Brazil African Biofuel Plan’ http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jul2010/gb20100715_303820.htm

[38] Paiva , Marcelo and Tsegay Wolde-Georgis (2010) ‘GUEST Editorial: “Brazil-Africa ‘Biofuels Diplomacy’: South-South Relations on the Rise.”’ http://fragilecologies.com/blog/?p=1452